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RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS PROVIDE UNEQUAL
TREATMENT: EX-FELON RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
CHERISH M. KELLER*
For to repeat, wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting
qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so
burdened or conditioned.
Harper v. Virginia Board of Electionsl
INTRODUCTION
The last two elections have been decided by slim margins. In 2000,
George W. Bush gained Florida's Electoral College votes by a margin of
537 popular votes.2 In 2004, Bush again achieved the presidency, gaining
Ohio's Electoral College votes by a margin of 118,599 popular votes. 3
When such small numbers of votes can determine the presidency of the
United States, it is all the more apparent that the right to vote is precious
and that every vote counts.
In this political atmosphere, laws concerning felony disenfranchise-
ment have again become a popular topic of debate. Approximately 4.7
million Americans have temporarily or permanently lost the right to vote as
a consequence of felony convictions. 4 Of those individuals, 1.7 million
have completed their criminal sentences. 5 And while public opinion does
* J.D. candidate 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author thanks Professors Sarah
Harding and Mark Rosen for all their comments and suggestions and Owen Brugh for his invaluable
support.
1. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
2. See U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2000 Presidential Election: Popular
Vote Totals, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2000/popular-vote.html (pro-
viding data that in Florida Bush earned 2,912,790 votes and Gore earned 2,912,253 votes) (last visited
July 31, 2005).
3. See U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2004 Presidential Election: Popular
Vote Totals, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2004/popular-vote.htm (last
visited July 31, 2005) (providing data that in Ohio Bush earned 2,859,764 votes and Kerry earned
2,741,165).
4. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 2,
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (last visited July 31, 2005).
5. Id.
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not tend to support voting rights for prisoners, the majority of the public
favors voting rights for ex-felons. 6
Provisions exist by which many ex-felons can regain the right to vote,
even in states where most ex-felons are by default permanently disenfran-
chised. 7 The potential impact of ex-felons exercising their right to vote is
significant. In the 2000 election, approximately 614,000 ex-felons were
disenfranchised in Florida.8 One statistical model indicates that if 27.2% of
those ex-felons had voted, approximately 68.9% would have chosen Al
Gore, and Gore would have gained Florida by a margin of more than
62,000 votes, thereby achieving the presidency. 9
This Note addresses the current state of ex-felon re-enfranchisement
laws-how ex-felons can reclaim their right to vote. Part I of this Note
provides background information in several different areas: the history of
felon voting laws, related normative arguments, and the leading Supreme
Court case that addressed felon and ex-felon voting rights. Part II of this
Note surveys analogous challenges to poll taxes and literacy tests, and it
examines wealth discrimination jurisprudence. Ex-felon re-
enfranchisement laws are similar in several respects to poll taxes and
wealth discrimination, particularly as some of these laws require ex-felons
to fully pay restitution costs before voting again. Part III of this Note de-
scribes past and current challenges to ex-felon re-enfranchisement laws
through the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases provide insight to the
necessary components of a successful challenge to re-enfranchisement
laws. Part IV of this Note examines current re-enfranchisement laws. The
current laws are often unclear and contain unrealistic requirements for
many ex-felons. Finally, Part V of this Note focuses on the ability of the
federal government to intervene and standardize ex-felon voting rights and
briefly discusses recent proposed legislation that addresses this issue.
I. FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
The right to vote is not per se a fundamental right. In its 2000 Bush v.
Gore opinion, the Supreme Court recounted its view on the right to vote,
stating that "[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to
vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the
6. Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Punishment and Democracy: Disenfranchisement of Nonin-
carcerated Felons in the United States, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 491, 500 (2004).
7. For instance, some individuals may be eligible to apply for a pardon or a restoration of their
civil rights. See infra Part IV.
8. Manza & Uggen, supra note 6, at 497.
9. Id. at 497-99.
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state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its
power to appoint members of the electoral college."'10 But, the Court con-
tinued, "[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in
its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamen-
tal .... ,I I While evaluating a state literacy test, the Court plainly stated
that the right to vote is guaranteed by the Constitution, but it is also subject
to standards established by individual states, provided those standards are
not discriminatory and do not contravene any restriction that Congress has
imposed on the states. 12 Essentially, "the political franchise of voting" is "a
fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights. ' 13 It is
"a bedrock of our political system."'14
A. History of Felony Disenfranchisement
Voting is a fundamental right that has historically been curtailed for an
array of groups, 15 including those convicted of felony offenses. Felony
disenfranchisement is not a new concept, and it is not unique to America.16
Certain criminals were barred from civic participation in ancient Greece
and Rome, medieval Europe, and later in England and colonial America. 17
This prohibition generally meant that after certain criminal convictions, an
individual could no longer participate in legal matters in the community-
including voting. 18 But as this prohibition evolved over time, what was
once a judicially directed, public punishment for severe crimes is now not
within judicial discretion, not a matter of public pronouncement, and can be
a consequence of minor crimes. 19
10. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
11. Id. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (stating that "[ilt has been repeatedly
recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote, and to have their
votes counted") (internal citations omitted).
12. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 47, 51 (1959).
13. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
14. Id.
15. For example, African Americans were only guaranteed the right to vote in 1870. U.S. CONST.
amend. XV. Women were only guaranteed the right to vote in 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
16. Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death ": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law
in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1045, 1059-62 (2002). Further, as states began to incorporate
felony disenfranchisement laws in their constitutions in the late eighteenth century, such laws were
"neither universal nor uniform." ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (2000) (footnote omitted).
17. Ewald, supra note 16, at 1059-61.
18. Id. at 1059-60.
19. See id. at 1059-61; see also Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt to
Society: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753,
779-81 (2000). Demleitner notes in particular that the list of felonies has grown simply as "an out-
growth of the regulatory state." Id. at 780. Because loss of the right to vote is a collateral offense and
not part of the punishment, it is not subject to a judge's discretion to impose it. See id. (noting that
2006]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Despite the general expansion of voting rights between 1790 and the
1850s, 20 states began denying those who had committed infamous crimes
or felonies the right to vote during this period as well. 2 1 The passage of
such laws, either through explicit exclusion of ex-felons in state constitu-
tions or through constitutional authorization for exclusion by statutes, typi-
cally generated little debate. 22 Out of the twenty-six states that existed in
1840, only four had passed disenfranchisement statutes; however, begin-
ning in the 1840s, many other states adopted new restrictions or broadened
existing restrictions on felon and ex-felon voting rights.23 Behind these
laws and similar laws that denied paupers and migrants the right to vote
was a desire to exclude individuals who occupied "the social margins of the
community" and engaged in undesirable behavior.24 These laws served
both a retributivist and a deterrent function 25 by punishing convicted felons
for their offenses and by attempting to preclude potential felons through
fear of losing the right to vote.
As part of an electoral reform movement between the Civil War and
World War I, many states revisited their voting laws.26 Around this period,
and for some time before the Civil War, many states expanded their crimi-
nal disenfranchisement laws.27 The rationale behind these laws shifted to
preserving the "purity of the ballot box" 28 and preventing ex-felons from
influencing elections-these laws were motivated by a generally unspoken
belief that voters should be moral people.29 In addition, felony disenfran-
disenfranchisement is automatic). The potential of this loss is not well-known, let alone publicly pro-
nounced. Id. at 788. In addition, with the expansion of crimes that qualify as "felonies," crimes punish-
able by death or more than a year in prison, more and more offenses result in disenfranchisement,
including many drug offenses. See id. at 780; JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 11-12 (1998),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9080.pdf.
20. KEYSSAR, supra note 16, at 28-33.
21. Id. at 62.
22. Id. at 63.
23. Manza & Uggen, supra note 6, at 492.
24. KEYSSAR, supra note 16, at 61-62.
25. Id. at 63.
26. Id. at 127.
27. Id. at 162.
28. Id. at 163. In the oft-quoted decision Washington v. State, the Alabama Supreme Court ex-
plained:
It is quite common also to deny the right of suffrage, in the various American States, to such
as have been convicted of infamous crimes. The manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of
the ballot box, which is the only sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs pro-
tection against the invasion of corruption, just as much as against that of ignorance, incapac-
ity, or tyranny.
75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884).
29. KEYSSAR, supra note 16, at 163.
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chisement was supported on a social contract theory: because ex-felons had
broken the social contract by breaking the law, they no longer deserved the
vote. 30 And in the South, some state felony disenfranchisement laws were
intentionally crafted to deprive more African Americans than whites of the
right to vote. 31
While these traditional rationalizations are analytically dubious 32 and
have been roundly criticized by scholars,33 the sentiments have not died
even in more modem times. One widely-cited example of this thinking is
Judge Friendly's reasoning in Green v. Board of Elections:
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpe-
trators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who
make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who
must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to consider
their cases .... A contention that the equal protection clause requires
New York to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or
judges would not only be without merit but as obviously so as anything
can be. 34
Spurred by a focus on rehabilitation, the apparent weaknesses of the
prior justifications, and a movement to expand the franchise in the 1960s
and 1970s, many states again re-evaluated their felony disenfranchisement
laws between 1960 and 1988. 35 During that period, more than fifteen states
eliminated lifetime disenfranchisement, and other states either eliminated
inconsistencies in the laws or reduced the list of crimes that resulted in
disenfranchisement. 36
30. See, e.g., Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "'The
Purity of the Ballot Box, " 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1304-05 (1989).
31. Ewald, supra note 16, at 1065; Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 738-43 (1998).
32. No studies have shown that ex-felons are more likely to engage in voting fraud than other
individuals. See Ewald, supra note 16, at 1099-1101. Breaking one law does not logically lead to the
conclusion that an individual has repudiated the entire social contract:
The idea that a single criminal transgression constitutes a repudiation of the entire social con-
tract conjures up raw Hobbesian ideas of the compact, in which one is either fully inside the
body or completely outside it. This view might have made sense in the walled cities of the
Renaissance, but today it is an anachronism.
Id. at 1103.
33. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 19, at 782-95 (critiquing current justifications); FELLNER &
MAUER, supra note 19, at 14-17 (same); Mark E. Thompson, Don't Do the Crime if You Ever Intend to
Vote Again: Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 195-98 (2002) (same; also suggesting that even if ex-felons wanted to
support a dishonest candidate, there are many ways to do that besides voting).
34. 380 F.2d 445,451-52 (2d Cir. 1967).
35. KEYSSAR, supra note 16, at 302-03.
36. Id. at 303.
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Still, significant restrictions on felons and ex-felons remain. The Sen-
tencing Project37 recently reported that seventeen states disenfranchise
inmates, parolees, and probationers; 38 five disenfranchise inmates and pa-
rolees; 39 and twelve others disenfranchise only current inmates. 40 Two
states have no restrictions and allow all convicted criminals, including in-
mates, to vote.41 But fourteen other states continue to disenfranchise in-
mates, parolees, probationers, and some or all ex-felons for life.42
37. The Sentencing Project is a nonprofit organization that is a "nationally recognized source of
criminal justice policy analysis, data, and program information." See generally The Sentencing Project,
http://www.sentencingproject.org (last vistited Sept. 22, 2005).
38. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4, at 3. The seventeen are Alaska, Arkansas,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
Notably, Iowa's Governor Tom Vilsack issued an executive order on July 4, 2005, that re-
stored voting rights to Iowa residents who have completed their felony sentences. Kate Slusark, Vilsack
Gives Felons Right to Vote, DES MOINES REG., July 5, 2005, at lB. An article in the Des Moines Regis-
ter reported that Vilsack said he wanted to help ex-felons rejoin society and become productive citizens.
See Jonathan Roos, Voter Registration Planned in D.M., DES MOINES REG., July 21, 2005, at lB.
Vilsack's executive order has not been without contention, however. Muscatine County Attorney Gary
Allison has challenged the validity of the order, and, because it is an executive order, it is not necessar-
ily permanent. Thomas Beaumont, Governor's Action Could Be Reversed, DES MOINES REG., July 4,
2005, at 6A. If this is made permanent, Iowa would become the eighteenth state on this list.
In addition, Rhode Island may change its status after the next election; both the Rhode Island
Senate and House of Representatives have approved legislation to place a constitutional amendment on
the ballot that would extend voting rights to individuals on probation and parole. Liz Anderson et al.,
Restoring Felons'Right to Vote Tops Legislative Proposals, PROVIDENCE J., June 24, 2005, at A14.
39. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4, at 3. The five are California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, New York, and South Dakota. Id.
40. See id. The twelve are Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah. Id.
41. See id. These states are Maine and Vermont. Id.
42. See id. at 2-3. These states include Alabama, Arizona (disenfranchises recidivists), Delaware
(requires a five-year waiting period), Florida, Iowa (per current law, it is still a lifetime disenfranchise-
ment state), Kentucky, Maryland (disenfranchises certain felons and ex-felons), Mississippi (disenfran-
chises for certain offenses), Nebraska, Nevada (disenfranchises recidivists and those convicted of
violent felonies), Tennessee (disenfranchisement depends on date of conviction and type of crime),
Virginia, Washington (disenfranchisement depends on date of conviction), and Wyoming (disenfran-
chisement depends on type of crime-some convictions require a five-year waiting period and others
permanently prevent an individual from voting). See id.; LAWYERS' COMMITrEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER LAW, 50-STATE REPORT ON RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT-A GUIDE TO RESTORING YOUR RIGHT TO
VOTE: A RESOURCE FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH FELONY CONVICTIONS AND ADVOCATES WHO WORK WITH
DISENFRANCHISED COMMUNITIES [hereinafter 50-STATE REPORT] §§ Md., Tenn., Wash., Wyo.,
http://www.lawyerscomm.org/ep04/50stateguide.pdf (last visited July 31, 2005) (providing additional
details on those states).
Nebraska changed its laws in March, 2005. See Nate Jenkins, Lawmakers Override Felon
Voting Veto, LINCOLN J. STAR, Mar. 11, 2005, at B . The state legislature overrode the governor's veto
to implement new legislation and replaced the old law that required ex-felons to wait ten years before
applying to have the right to vote restored. Id. Now, ex-felons' voting rights are automatically restored
two years after completion of their sentences. L.B. 53, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005), available
at http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/legal/SLIP-LB53.pdf.
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B. Normative Arguments Against Disenfranchisement
States should not deny ex-felons the right to vote for several norma-
tive reasons. First, disenfranchisement is a collateral consequence of a con-
viction, not part of any sentence, 4 3 and is contrary to the retributivist theory
of criminal law.4 4 As one scholar noted, "[s]uch an excessive collateral
consequence, especially when combined with the magnitude and frequency
of prison sentences in the Untied States, belies the lip service paid to retri-
bution as the primary punishment goal."'45 Further, disenfranchisement is
not a response to the severity of the offense, as would be appropriate for a
proper retributivist measure;46 instead, it is a response to the perceived
dangerousness of the offender.4 7
Second, denying voting rights creates a political and social sub-class 4 8
of state-mandated non-voters, thereby working against rehabilitation. Ex-
felons in general already comprise a "permanent undercaste," as they are
stigmatized by being ex-felons. 49 In addition to the other challenges ex-
felons face, such as in employment qualifications, denial of voting rights is
symbolic, for it denies the right to political participation. 50 As one com-
mentator observed, "[t]hose who have served their time are left with the
message that they are inherently unreliable members of the democracy.
Whether they would vote regularly or not, they are treated as though they
were permanently banished from the political community."' 5 1 Voting is a
vital part of civic participation,5 2 and this marginalization of ex-felons can
impede their efforts to rejoin their communities. 53 Allowing ex-felons the
right to vote, on the other hand, would potentially increase their sense of
social or civic consciousness and encourage them to become law-abiding
community members. 54
The length of the disenfranchisement also sends a social message to
ex-felons. A short-term exclusion, such as temporarily denying the right to
43. Because disenfranchisement is not part of any sentence, it is considered a "collateral conse-
quence" of conviction. Ewald, supra note 16, at 1057.
44. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 19, at 774-75.
45. Id.
46. Ewald, supra note 16, at 1103.
47. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895, 1896 (1999).
48. Demleitner, supra note 19, at 775.
49. Fletcher, supra note 47, at 1897.
50. Demleitner, supra note 19, at 775.
51. Fletcher, supra note 46, at 1898-99.
52. See Ewald, supra note 16, at 1087.
53. Note, supra note 30, at 1315.
54. See Ewald, supra note 16, at 1110-12.
2006] 205
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vote while incarcerated, expresses the state's confidence in the individual's
ultimate rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. 55 Long-term
exclusions, like permanent or permanent-by-default 56 disenfranchisement,
are more punitive and dishonorable. 57 Further, disenfranchisement can
create feelings of guilt, which may lead to further alienation and exclusion
from society. 58
Third, disenfranchisement is a dubious deterrent. 59 Because disenfran-
chisement is not a well-known consequence of felony convictions, it cannot
actually function as a deterrent. 60 Perhaps disenfranchisement worked as a
shaming penalty earlier in our nation's history, when only a small percent-
age of the population could vote and the right to vote was stripped publicly,
announced in court as part of the sentence.61 However, in today's very
different political atmosphere, "when half of eligible Americans do not care
to vote, the silent disenfranchisement of felons does not send much of a
public message.' '62
C. The Fourteenth Amendment and Richardson v. Ramirez
While normative arguments direct that all ex-felons should be able to
vote, Supreme Court jurisprudence 63 and the literal language of the Consti-
tution64 allow states to disenfranchise ex-felons. On its face, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to prohibit felony
disenfranchisement laws, mandating that "[n]o State shall... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'65 How-
ever, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly addresses disen-
franchisement for crimes, stating, "But when the right to vote at any
election... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State... or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
55. Demleitner, supra note 19, at 782.
56. Disenfranchisement can be permanent by default if ex-felons are unaware of their ability to
regain their right to vote.
57. Demleitner, supra note 19, at 781.
58. Id. at 786. Such exclusion is implicit in disenfranchisement, as it underscores the socially
constructed image of the criminal as an outsider. See Note, supra note 30, at 1311-13.
59. Demleitner, supra note 19, at 788.
60. Id. (supporting proposition that existence of disenfranchisement provisions is not well known).
61. Id. at 787; Ewald, supra note 16, at 1118-19.
62. Ewald, supra note 16, at 1119.
63. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
65. Id. § I.
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basis of representation therein shall be reduced .... "66 Prior to the seminal
Supreme Court case Richardson v. Ramirez,67 most scholars concluded that
it was not appropriate to apply a narrow reading of this language to current
felony disenfranchisement laws. The likely intent of the enactors of that
Constitutional provision was not simply to disenfranchise felons and ex-
felons;68 instead, Congress likely inserted the crimes language of Section 2
to allow states to disenfranchise those who had participated in the Civil
War.69 However, states rarely used the provision for this purpose. 70
As part of Reconstruction after the Civil War, Section 2 was an at-
tempt to change the South's treatment of African American suffrage-to
promote the right to vote, not limit it.71 The Fourteenth Amendment was
strongly condemned in the southern states, however, and Congress realized
that Section 2 would not actually increase African American voting
rights. 72 The Fifteenth Amendment, passed soon thereafter, did outright
what the Fourteenth was intended to encourage, and made African Ameri-
can suffrage both national and permanent. 73 After Reconstruction, com-
mentary of scholars and those involved in the Reconstruction Amendments
reflected Congress's intent for the Fifteenth Amendment to undermine or
repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 However, in 1974, the
Supreme Court in Richardson v. Ramirez75 concluded that disenfranchise-
ment laws are not inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause, 76 because
66. Id. § 2 (emphasis added). The full text reads:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial offi-
cers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabi-
tants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Id.
67. 418 U.S. 24.
68. Id.
69. Ewald, supra note 16, at 1104.
70. Id.
71. Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 264 (2004).
For an in-depth discussion of Section 2 and the subsequent drafting of the Fifteenth Amendment, see id.
at 264-72.
72. Id. at 269.
73. Id. at 272.
74. Id. at 272-75.
75. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). The decision has garnered much criticism. E.g., Developments in the
Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1950 & n.99 (2002) (also referenced as One
Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement).
76. 418 U.S. at 55. Earlier in the opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that:
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of the express language of Section 2, the legislative history of the section
and similar contemporary laws, and prior judicial interpretation of the
amendment's applicability to state laws. 77 The Court stated:
[W]e may rest on the demonstrably sound proposition that § 1, in dealing
with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a
form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less
drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other
forms of disenfranchisement. Nor can we accept respondents' argument
that because § 2 was made part of the Amendment "'largely through the
accident of political exigency rather than through the relation which it
bore to the other sections of the Amendment,"' we must not look to it for
guidance in interpreting § 1.78
Yet this decision did not mean that the Equal Protection Clause never
could be applied to felony disenfranchisement laws. In 1985, the Supreme
Court held that a section of the Alabama Constitution that disenfranchised
individuals convicted of certain felonies and misdemeanors, including "any
crime ... involving moral turpitude," violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the section was originally enacted to be racially discriminatory. 79
The Court declined to analyze Section 2's "implicit authorization" of states
to disenfranchise individuals convicted of crimes, but stated that "we are
Although the Court has never given plenary consideration to the precise question of whether a
State may constitutionally exclude some or all convicted felons from the franchise, we have
indicated approval of such exclusions on a number of occasions. In two cases decided toward
the end of the last century, the Court approved exclusions of bigamists and polygamists from
the franchise under territorial laws of Utah and Idaho. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885);
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). Much more recently we have strongly suggested in
dicta that exclusion of convicted felons from the franchise violates no constitutional provi-
sion.
Id. at 53 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)). In addition to
the two cases decided more than a century ago and some dicta, Rehnquist cited several summary affir-
mations, then noted that these cases present "settled... judicial understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment's effect on state laws disenfranchising convicted felons .... " Id. at 53-54 (emphasis
added).
Other Supreme Court cases had mentioned disenfranchising felons in dicta, but none had
expressly addressed the constitutionality of doing so. For example, in Gray v. Sanders, the Court stated:
The only weighting of votes sanctioned by the Constitution concerns matters of representa-
tion, such as the allocation of Senators .... Minors, felons, and other classes may be ex-
cluded. But once the class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no
constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be evaded.
372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963) (citations omitted). In addition, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court noted:
A person who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty and often his
right to vote. If, in the exercise of the power to protect banks, both sanctions were imposed
for the purpose of punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing both disabilities would be
penal. But because the purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eli-
gibility for voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the
franchise.
356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).
77. 418 U.S. at 54.
78. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
79. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223, 233 (1985).
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confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful racial dis-
crimination attending the enactment and operation of [the disenfranchise-
ment section of the Alabama Constitution] which otherwise violates § 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v. Rami-
rez suggests the contrary." 80 Thus, while Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment influences the application of section one, it does not preclude
the Equal Protection Clause from being applied in at least one other con-
text.
1I. ANALOGOUS EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES, WEALTH
DISCRIMINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an
age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and strive to move
closer to that goal.
Griffin v. Illinois 8 1
Generally, the Equal Protection Clause limits the types of classifica-
tions states may make. When a classification denies access to a fundamen-
tal right, equal protection principles mandate that the classification
withstand strict scrutiny:
In decision after decision, this Court has made clear that a citizen has a
constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal ba-
sis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. This "equal right to vote" is not
absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to
regulate access to the franchise in other ways. But, as a general matter,
"before that right [to vote] can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction
and the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close con-
stitutional scrutiny."82
To survive strict scrutiny review, the classification must be narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.83 Further, the Court has
stated that strict scrutiny review is required "because some resident citizens
are permitted to participate [through voting] and some are not"-it is not a
result of the subject of the election. 84
While this strict scrutiny requirement might seem contrary to the
states' prerogative to determine conditions under which citizens may
80. Id. at 233 (citation omitted).
81. 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
82. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (em-
phasis added).
83. See, e.g., id. at 335; Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).
84. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 629.
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vote, 85 the restrictions that the Supreme Court has upheld typically with-
stand strict scrutiny or are exceptions to the rule. For instance, the Court
held that durational requirement laws, mandating how long an individual
must reside in a state before being eligible to vote, must be "measured by a
strict equal protection test" and struck down unless they are necessary to
further a compelling state interest. 86 And while the Court upheld a statute
that extended the franchise for water storage district elections exclusively
to property owners in the district, the Court identified that situation as an
exception to the rule.87
A. Unacceptable Restrictions on the Right to Vote: Poll Taxes and
Literacy Tests
The Equal Protection Clause has long limited the ability of states to
restrict the right to vote.88 States have the ability to determine the condi-
tions for the exercise of the right to vote, but only as long as those condi-
tions are not unconstitutionally discriminatory. 89
Poll taxes and literacy tests exemplify two areas where the Equal Pro-
tection Clause has limited the states' ability to define qualifications for
their electorate. While not initially deemed per se unconstitutional, literacy
tests were held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment when applied un-
equally to different races, 90 as were "interpretation tests," which were used
to make a subjective judgment about an individual's understanding of the
85. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 ("[T]he Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requi-
site for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII
("The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the State legislatures.").
86. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 342. See also Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973) (per curiam)
(recognizing compelling reasons for the state to have a fifty-day residency requirement); Dunn, 405
U.S. at 360 (striking down one-year residency requirement).
87. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973). Kramer
struck down laws that restricted the franchise to owners or lessees of taxable property, their spouses,
and parents or guardians of public school children, because no narrowly tailored, compelling interest
existed which could justify such a restriction. 395 U.S. at 633. In contrast, in Salyer Land Co., the Court
concluded that enfranchising only landowners in the water storage district was a permissible exception
to the rule regarding vote apportionment, considering the water district's special limited purpose and the
disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners. 410 U.S. at 728. The Court distinguished Salyer
Land Co. from Kramer, noting that while Kramer opened the franchise to all residents and then ex-
cluded some, Salyer Land Co. extended the franchise only to the owners of the land that benefited. Id.
at 729-30. Thus, because of these special considerations, the Court did not use strict scrutiny analysis.
See id. at 728-30.
88. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 53. The Court concluded that while a literacy test could not be used to perpetuate dis-
crimination, that was not the case at hand, and states could legitimately consider the ability to read and
write as having some relation to promoting the intelligent use of the ballot. Id. at 51-52.
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state or federal constitution. 91 Poll taxes were similarly analyzed under the
Equal Protection Clause. 92 In holding that poll taxes violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Court proclaimed that "we must remember that the in-
terest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix
qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's
ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process."93
The pertinent equal protection principles that apply to poll taxes and
literacy tests logically apply in other contexts. The Supreme Court recently
noted that "[e]qual protection applies as well to the manner of [the fran-
chise's] exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the
State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's
vote over that of another."'94 And in 1966, the Court noted that "once the
franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. ' '95 While the rights of felons and ex-felons to vote may be taken
away by the states pursuant to Richardson,96 the mechanisms by which
states extend a way to regain the right to vote should logically be governed
by equal protection principles.
B. Wealth Discrimination Alone
Wealth alone is not a suspect class, and thus discrimination based only
on wealth is not protected by the Equal Protection Clause.97 Yet wealth
discrimination does not entirely evade scrutiny, and, considering past juris-
91. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965). In Louisiana, the Court held that subjec-
tive tests that required potential voters to interpret parts of the state or federal constitution as a prerequi-
site to voting were unconstitutional because the tests were being applied subjectively and in an arbitrary
manner. Id. at 152-53. (Because illiterate individuals could have the passages read to them, id. at 149 &
n.8, interpretation tests were not explicitly literacy tests.) The Fifteenth Amendment was also a strong
basis for these determinations. The Louisiana Court generally held that the subjective tests "violate[d]
the Constitution" and specifically noted that the tests violated the Fifteenth Amendment because they
discriminated on the basis of race. Id. at 153. When the Court upheld an amendment to the Voting
Rights Act that prohibited the use of literacy tests, a majority of the justices based Congress's enact-
ment power in the Fifteenth Amendment. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (opinion of
Black, J.) (citing Fifteenth Amendment power for literacy test prohibition); id. at 216 (Harlan, J., same);
id. at 235-36 (Brennan, White, & Marshall, JJ., same); id. at 282 (Stewart & Blackmun, JJ., & Chief
Justice, same). Only Justice Douglas reasoned that the provision was valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Fourteenth Amendment power for literacy test
prohibition).
92. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that states that use
affluence or the payment of a fee as a voting requirement violate the Equal Protection Clause).
93. Id. at 668.
94. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (citing Harper, 383 U.S. at 665).
95. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665. This is the quote that the Bush Court referenced from Harper to
support the previous statement. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
96. See4l8U.S.24,55-56 (1974).
97. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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prudence, the use of wealth discrimination as a barrier to exercising the
fundamental right to vote should be analyzed using strict scrutiny. 98
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court
declined to use heightened scrutiny to evaluate Texas's school financing
system based purely on the poverty of school districts within an area with a
relatively lower tax base.99 However, as the Court pointed out, the situation
in San Antonio lacked several essential factors that had been present in
earlier wealth discrimination cases.100 In the earlier cases, "because of [the
individuals' or groups'] impecunity they were completely unable to pay for
some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit." 101 In San
Antonio, children in districts with lower property values received an educa-
tion with lesser funding, but they did not receive no education.102 And
appellees had not, according to the Court, demonstrated that the Texas
school financing system "operate[d] to the peculiar disadvantage of any
class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose in-
comes are beneath any designated poverty level. ' 103 The Court went on to
propose that it was not necessarily true that the poorest people lived in the
poorest districts, noting that studies in another state had found that poor
people had clustered around areas with commercial and industrial tax
bases. 104 Thus while the San Antonio Court declined to apply strict scrutiny
because of wealth discrimination, that rejection was primarily due to the
lack of the essential factors that were present in previous cases.
The factors that were missing in San Antonio are present when ex-
felons are unable to pay fees (including outstanding restitution) that are
necessary to recover their right to vote or muster the political and financial
resources that are necessary to convince the legislature or governor to re-
store their civil rights. Ex-felons who are unable to pay restitution 05 or
who are unable to gather financial and political resources are likely poor.
Considering that ex-felons typically face difficulty in finding employ-
98. See infra Part II.C.
99. 411U.S. at40.
100. Id. at 18-22 (discussing, inter alia, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1971)).
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id. at 23.
103. Id. at 22-23.
104. Id. at 23.
105. This is not to suggest that ex-felons should not pay restitution, but rather that conditioning
restoration of the right to vote on completed payment of restitution puts poor ex-felons at a particular
disadvantage and in a situation that similarly situated wealthy ex-felons would not experience.
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ment, 106 it is not a leap of logic to conclude that ex-felons, as a group, are
more likely to be poor than the average member of society. Finally, there is
an "absolute deprivation" of the right at issue, the right to vote. Until ex-
felons have their civil rights restored, or the right to vote specifically re-
stored, they simply cannot vote.
C. Wealth Discrimination in Conjunction with Restrictions on a
Fundamental Right
Once given to the people of a state, the right to vote is a fundamental
right. 107 State-imposed restrictions on the right to vote, such as literacy
tests and poll taxes, violate the Equal Protection Clause. 108 State-imposed
obstacles to ex-felons trying to regain their right to vote belong in the same
category and merit strict scrutiny analysis. Such state-imposed obstacles
fail this analysis.
Placing a condition on an ex-felon's eligibility for restoration of civil
rights in order to provide an incentive to pay restitution does not withstand
strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court expressed its disapproval of such a ra-
tionale in Zablocki v. Redhail,109 a case involving a state statute that condi-
tioned the right of individuals who were subject to child support payments
to marry and required a showing that the applicant had satisfied the child
support obligations and that the children involved would not become public
charges."l 0 The Court specifically noted that relying on the condition as an
incentive to make child support payments was not a compelling justifica-
tion for restricting the right to marry: "This 'collection device' rationale
cannot justify the statute's broad infringement on the right to marry."]1 '
The Court ultimately struck down the statute on equal protection
grounds. 112 Like the right to marry, the right to vote, once granted, is a
fundamental right. If a "collection device" rationale failed to justify restric-
tions on the right to marry, it should similarly fail in conjunction with the
right to vote. Just as with child support payments in Zablocki, there are
106. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A
National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10, 13 (noting that
in 1996, a few states barred convicted felons from public employment, several left the decision to the
employer, and several applied a "direct relationship test" to determine whether the conviction would
influence job performance).
107. See supra notes 10- 12 and accompanying text.
108. See supra Part II.A.
109. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
110. Id. at 389.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 382.
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other means that the state can use to encourage payment of restitution and
court costs, such as wage garnishments. 113
Conditioning eligibility for restoration of civil rights on the payment
of fines is also akin to a poll tax. Poll taxes, like the one struck down in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,114 demanded that individuals pay a
fee before being allowed to vote. One commentator analogized today's
disenfranchisement laws to poll taxes because of disenfranchisement laws'
effect on so many people and their disproportionate effect on African
Americans.1 15 Two courts that have explicitly rejected this analogy 1 6 miss
the heart of the matter. Simply put, when ex-felons must meet certain crite-
ria (e.g., full payment of restitution or petitioning the governor for a par-
don) before being able to vote, meeting these criteria almost invariably
requires money (as well as time and resources), and thus, this money must
be paid before being able to vote.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down on equal protection
grounds other obstacles that prevented indigent individuals from accessing
fundamental rights. In Griffin v. Illinois, the Court held that Illinois' refusal
to provide a transcript to indigent appellees was unconstitutional, based on
Due Process and Equal Protection Clause principles. 117 The Court noted
that Illinois was not required to provide appellate review, but that once it
did, it could not do so in a manner that discriminated against those con-
victed defendants who were indigent. 118 The Court succinctly stated,
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has."'1 19 Seven years later, in Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, the Court held that an indigent defendant, appealing as of right, has
113. The Zablocki Court suggested this as one means of collecting child support. Id. at 389-90.
Garnishment was also suggested in Williams v. Illinois as a way to collect money owed to the court. 399
U.S. 235, 245 (1970).
114. 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). In 1964, poll taxes were made unconstitutional by the Twenty-
fourth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
115. See J. Whyatt Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 435, 436-37 (2001). Mondesire is the President of the Philadelphia Branch of
the NAACP. Id. at 435 n.*.
116. The courts are Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002), affd sub nom Johnson
v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated for reh'g en banc, 377 F.3d 1163 (1lth
Cir. 2004), affd en banc 405 F.3d 1214 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. 2005)
(No. 05-212), and Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (unpublished table decision), No. 99-2285, 2000
WL 203984 (4th Cir. 2000). See also discussion infra Part III.B.
117. 351 U.S. 12, 14, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion, with a fifth Justice concurring). The Court noted
that "[w]e do not hold, however, that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case
where a defendant cannot buy it. The Supreme Court may find other means of affording adequate and
effective appellate review to indigent defendants." Id. at 20.
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 19.
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the right to counsel. 120 The Court repeated that whether denying a tran-
script or denying counsel, "the evil is the same: discrimination against the
indigent."121
The logic in Williams v. Illinois also directs that conditioning re-
enfranchisement on the ability to pay (whether restitution, court costs, or
costs to maneuver a political solution) is not constitutional. 122 In Williams,
the Court held on equal protection grounds that the state could not imprison
an indigent person beyond the statutory maximum for a crime simply be-
cause he could not pay the fees and court costs levied in the case. 123 In-
stead, "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive of-
fense be the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic
status."'1 24 To arrive at its holding, the Court acknowledged that it had to
defy a longstanding tradition and judicial adherence to that tradition, 125 and
that its ruling would cause a further burden on the state's administration of
criminal justice. 126 The Court, however, held that because incarceration
beyond the statutory maximum applied only to individuals without the
financial resources to satisfy the monetary part of any judgment, the state
had imposed different consequences on two categories of individuals based
on their financial resources.127 One year later, the Court reiterated its con-
clusion in Williams and extended it to hold that converting a fines-only
punishment into imprisonment for an indigent defendant also violated the
Equal Protection Clause.128
Because voting is a fundamental right, and because restrictions on
fundamental rights that disproportionately affect the poor have been held to
violate the Equal Protection Clause, obstacles to restoration of the right to
vote should be struck down. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides for optional disenfranchisement of ex-felons, and thus a state can
choose to disenfranchise all or some of its ex-felons. 129 However, when a
state provides a mechanism by which ex-felons can regain the right to vote,
120. 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
121. Id. at 355. The Court then quoted the language it used in Griffin v. Illinois, stating, "For there
can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he
has."' Id. (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19).
122. See 399 U.S. 235, 242-45 (1970).
123. Id. at 243-44.
124. Id. at 244 (footnote omitted).
125. Id. at 239-40.
126. Id. at 245.
127. Id. at 242 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n. 11 (1956).
128. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1971). The Court also suggested that there were alterna-
tive methods of collecting fines, such as installment plans. Id. at 400 & n.5.
129. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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then a fundamental right is at stake. Then, Section 2 no longer applies and
courts should focus on the re-enfranchisement mechanism. Strict scrutiny is
the appropriate level of review for that analysis because of the fundamental
right involved, because of past treatment of the indigent in the cases dis-
cussed above when a fundamental right was at stake, and because indi-
gence is often the barrier that prevents ex-felons from regaining the right to
vote. 130
III. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT
LAWS
A. Past Challenges
During the last several decades, a handful of cases involving Equal
Protection and Due Process Clause claims against the laws that provide for
ex-felon re-enfranchisement have been raised in the federal courts. 131 None
of the courts that addressed these claims analyzed them under strict scru-
tiny, which is the appropriate level of review for classifications that restrict
access to a fundamental right. 132 However, most of the courts recognized
the importance of the right, and these cases provide guidance for future
challenges to re-enfranchisement laws.
William Bynum, an ex-felon convicted of statutory burglary, brought
one such case, challenging a Connecticut statute that required ex-felons to
pay a five dollar fee before being allowed to petition the Commission on
Forfeited Rights to have their voting rights reinstated. 133 In 1969, in Bynum
v. Connecticut Commission on Forfeited Rights, the Second Circuit re-
versed the lower court's refusal to convene a three-judge court, reasoning
that Bynum presented a "substantial issue" that required review by such a
court. 
1 34
Bynum did not challenge the propriety of ex-felon disenfranchise-
ment, 135 and the court suggested that its decision in Green v. Board of
130. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
131. See Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1982); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 110
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Bynum v. Conn. Comm'n on Forfeited Rights, 410
F.2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1969).
132. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (noting that the denial of the right to
vote is the denial of a fundamental right; stating that "before that right to vote can be restricted, the
purpose of the restriction... must meet close constitutional scrutiny").
133. Bynum, 410 F.2dat 175.
134. Id. at 177. No subsequent history indicates whether Bynum was ultimately successful.
135. Id. at 175.
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Elections136 precluded such a challenge. 137 Instead, the court recognized
the issue as "whether Connecticut, once having agreed to permit ex-felons
to regain their vote and having established administrative machinery for
this purpose, can then deny access to this relief, solely because one is too
poor to pay the required fee."' 138 In part, the court recognized Bynum's
claim as substantial because he framed it as an arbitrary and unreasonable
condition--one based on his financial condition. 139 However, because the
merit of the claim itself was not before the court, the court did not rule on
whether his argument would ultimately succeed.14 0
Nine years later, in Shepherd v. Trevino, the Fifth Circuit held that
when providing a mechanism for re-enfranchisement, distinguishing be-
tween convictions for state and federal felonies did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 141 The two plaintiffs in Shepherd had been convicted of
federal felonies and had been automatically disenfranchised by a Texas
statute. 142 In Texas at the time, an individual convicted of a state felony
who had satisfactorily completed probation could apply to the court that
convicted the individual to restore his or her civil rights, including the right
to vote. 143 Individuals convicted of federal crimes had no comparable rem-
edy; they could only regain their voting rights in Texas through a presiden-
tial pardon. 144 Plaintiffs argued that Texas violated the Equal Protection
Clause when it treated ex-felons convicted in a state court differently than
ex-felons convicted in a federal court.145
136. 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
137. SeeBynum, 410F.2dat 175.
138. Id. at 175-76.
139. Id. at 176.
140. Id. at 177.
141. 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
142. Id. at 1111.
143. Id. at 1115. Technically, the court of conviction had the power to set aside the ex-felon's
conviction, which would remove him or her from the class of persons who have been convicted of a
felony. Id. at 1113. However, the Fifth Circuit called that line of reasoning disingenuous, because the
individual's conviction-which had been set aside-could still be presented to a court if he or she was
subsequently convicted of another offense, and the Texas Attorney General had concluded that an
individual whose conviction had been set aside could not truthfully tell an employer that he or she had
never been convicted of a felony. Id. The court concluded that "[u]nder Texas law the main distinction
between felons whose convictions have been set aside and all other felons is that the former can exer-
cise their civil rights, including the right to vote, while the latter cannot." Id. at 1114. Thus, while it is
true that Texas state courts likely would not have been able to set aside federal convictions, the essence
of the matter was that the statutory scheme that Texas set up allowed only individuals convicted of a
state felony to apply to have their right to vote restored. See id. at 1113, 1115.
144. Id. at 1113.
145. Id. at I111.
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The Shepherd court interpreted Richardson v. Ramirez146 broadly, not-
ing that while a narrow reading of the case might have supported the plain-
tiffs' allegations, the court believed that Section 2 "blunt[ed] the full force
of section l's equal protection clause with respect to the voting rights of
felons."' 147 Thus the court concluded that strict scrutiny did not apply and
that laws concerning selective disenfranchisement or re-enfranchisement of
ex-felons only had to be rationally related to achieving a legitimate state
interest. 148 Further, the court recognized that while Texas could have estab-
lished a similar system to provide for the re-enfranchisement of individuals
convicted of a federal felony, any such administrative agency would not be
as familiar with the individual's trial, conviction, and behavior while on
probation as the state court would be with an individual whom it had tried
and convicted of a state felony. 149
However, the Shepherd court missed the mark when it came to the
proper level of scrutiny. Because a fundamental right was at stake, legiti-
macy was not the proper standard,150 and strict scrutiny should have been
employed. While Richardson does allow states to disenfranchise some or
all convicted felons, 151 as the Shepherd court noted, 152 the state's disen-
franchisement scheme was not at issue. Instead, the re-enfranchisement
provisions were in question. Texas allowed some ex-felons to get their
right to vote back-which is akin to the state again extending the right to
vote to its residents, and is similar to Illinois' decision to provide appellate
review that the Supreme Court addressed in Griffin v. Illinois.153 Even
146, 418 U.S. 24(1974).
147. 575 F.2d at 1114.
148. Id. at 1114-15.
149. Id. at I 15. In addition, although administrative convenience is a dubious justification in
Equal Protection jurisprudence and does not withstand strict scrutiny, administrative concerns appear to
be the crux of the Fifth Circuit's justification. In Frontiero v. Richardson, Justice Brennan, writing for
the plurality, admonished against using administrative convenience as a justification for dissimilar
treatment, stating that "any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the
purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands 'dissimilar treatment for men
and women who are ... similarly situated,' and therefore involves the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the [Constitution] ....' 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (plurality opinion) (three Jus-
tices concurring in the result) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). While this rational applied to
discrimination based on a suspect class (sex), it is logical to extend it to discrimination that affects
access to a fundamental right.
150. The Shepherd court cited McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), for its standard of
scrutiny. 575 F.2d at 1115. However, McGowan addressed Sunday Closing laws-the case did not
involve a fundamental right. See 366 U.S. 420. Because the classification in Shepherd interfered with a
fundamental right, a higher standard should have been used. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 386-87 (1978).
151. See4l8U.S.at55-56.
152. 575 F.2d at ll4.
153. 351 U.S. 12 at 18 (1956) (plurality opinion); see discussion supra text accompanying notes
117-19,
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though Texas did not need to extend the right to vote at all, when it did so,
it was required to do so under methods that withstand strict scrutiny. 154
Thus, the distinction between treatment for ex-felons convicted under state
laws and ex-felons convicted under federal laws had to be narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest, 155 which it was not.
And in 1982, the Fifth Circuit in Williams v. Taylor briefly addressed
the pardon procedure by which ex-felons could regain the right to vote. 156
Neither of the two primary claims in the case concerned re-
enfranchisement, 157 and only in the conclusion did the court address the
petitioner's claim that the governor and the state legislature administered
pardons in an arbitrary and capricious manner, thus violating due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 158 The Williams court affirmed the
lower court's summary judgment against the plaintiff because he lacked
standing. 159 Further, the court noted that there was no evidence that the
plaintiff tried to obtain a pardon, "[n]or [was] there any competent evi-
dence to support appellant's assertion that only the rich and influential in
the state are able to obtain pardons."' 160 With evidence of such a trend, the
implication is that the claim could succeed. 161
B. Present Challenges
Similar issues to those presented in Bynum, Shepherd, and Williams
have emerged in the last few years. 162 Again, challenges to re-
enfranchisement procedures have not been the primary claim in any of the
154. See supra notes 10- 12 and accompanying text.
155. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 342 (1972).
156. 677 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1982).
157. The case centered on a procedural due process claim to a pre-disenfranchisement hearing and
a claim of selective enforcement of the disenfranchisement provisions. Id. at 514-17. The court primar-
ily addressed these claims, concluding that the due process claim was without merit, id. at 515, and
remanding the case for further consideration of the selective enforcement claim, id. at 517.
158. Id. at 517.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The court also concluded:
[Aippellant's argument... is an attack on the state's ability to determine that felons should
not be allowed to vote. Since the Supreme Court and this court have upheld the state's power
to classify felons separately with respect to the right to vote, as having an affirmative sanction
in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant's argument must fail.
Id. at 518 (internal citations and footnote omitted). However, this argument addresses the validity of
disenfranchisement, not measures that provide re-enfranchisement.
162. See Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342-43 (S.D. Fla. 2002), affid en banc 405 F.3d
1214 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. 2005) (No. 05-212); Hayden v. Pataki, No.
00 Civ. 8586(LMM), 2004 WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d
1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Locke v. Farrakhan, 125 S. Ct. 477 (2004).
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following cases, but the following courts' approaches to the claims provide
guidance for future challenges.
In Farrakhan v. Washington, the plaintiffs based their primary claim
on the Voting Rights Act 163 and alleged that Washington's felony disen-
franchisement laws constituted race-based vote denial. 164 The plaintiffs
also alleged that the restoration process was "cumbersome, excessively
complex, and place[d] difficult burdens on offenders seeking restoration of
voting rights"; however, the court held that without evidence that minori-
ties were less able to complete requirements for re-enfranchisement, the
claim failed. 165 Citing Bynum, though, the court recognized an alternate
route:
Plaintiffs also argue that the statutory requirement that they repay their
monetary obligations in order to be eligible for restoration amounts to a
de facto poll tax. Although this argument might be cognizable as an
equal protection claim, see Bynum v. Conn. Comm 'n of Forfeited Rights,
410 F.2d 173, 176-77 (2nd Cir.1969), we do not consider it here because
Plaintiffs have not asserted any equal protection claims. 16 6
The fact that the court specifically mentioned an avenue of relief that the
plaintiffs had not raised suggests that such a route could be successful.
Subsequently, in Hayden v. Pataki, a New York district court analyzed
several claims that challenged New York's disenfranchisement laws. 167 Of
particular note, one claim challenged the practice of disenfranchising only
felons who were incarcerated or who were on parole, and not disenfran-
chising probationers.168 The court noted that the plaintiffs were correct that
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not eliminate all equal protec-
tion considerations relating to felons and the right to vote. 169 It cited Wil-
liams v. Taylor for that proposition and the "finding that '[n]o one would
contend that section 2 permits a state to disenfranchise all felons and then
re-enfranchise only those who are, say, white.""' 170 But the court asserted
that distinctions may be drawn between similarly situated individuals when
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
164. 338 F.3d at 1011.
165. Id. at 1021-22.
166. Id. at 1022 n.19.
167. 2004 WL 1335921. The Right to Vote: Campaign to End Felony Disenfranchisement website
notes that this case is being appealed from the dismissal on the pleadings. Pending Litigation,
http://www.righttovote.org/legalpending.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2005). The Second Circuit heard oral
argument on Hayden (combined with another case) on June 22, 2005. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE
AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., SECOND CIRCUIT SCHEDULED TO HEAR LANDMARK VOTING
RESTORATION CASES (June 21, 2005), http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=632.
168. Hayden, 2004 WL 1335921, at *4-5.
169. Id. at *4.
170. Id. (citing Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 516 (5th Cir. 1982)) (alteration in original).
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the distinctions are rational and not arbitrary. 17 1 Accordingly, the court held
that a distinction between prisoners and parolees on the one hand, and pro-
bationers on the other hand, was rational because members of the first
group have received more severe punishments (considering that parolees
are still technically serving prison sentences). 172
While the court was correct in noting that rational distinctions may be
drawn between similarly situated groups in most instances, 173 rational dis-
tinctions are not enough when the classification restricts access to a funda-
mental right.174 The broad reading of Richardson v. Ramirez that the Fifth
Circuit utilized in Shepherd 75 would likely direct that such a classification
can stand, because states are permitted to completely disenfranchise ex-
felons. But considering that the classification between prisoners and parol-
ees as one group and probationers as another group restricted access to the
fundamental right to vote, strict scrutiny was appropriate.176 Regardless of
the level of scrutiny applied, however, the classification and restriction at
issue in Hayden would likely stand. As the Hayden court noted, members
of the first group are still technically serving prison sentences, 177 and thus
the distinction is likely narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state
interest of punishing convicted felons. Although the court did not apply the
appropriate level of scrutiny to a restriction on the right to vote, the result
would likely be the same under any level of scrutiny.
Plaintiffs in Johnson v. Bush again raised the issue of wealth discrimi-
nation. 178 The larger questions at issue were whether there was an imper-
missible discriminatory intent behind the felony disenfranchisement
provision in Florida's constitution and whether there was a Voting Rights
Act violation. 179 However, the plaintiffs also alleged that Florida's Rules of




173. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (noting that "reasonable regulations
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship [another funda-
mental right] may legitimately be imposed").
174. Id. at 386-87.
175. 575 F.2d O 110, 1114(5th Cir. 1978).
176. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. The Court stated that "[wihen a statutory classification signifi-
cantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental ight, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." Id.
177. 2004WL 1335921,at*4.
178. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342-43 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd sub nom Johnson v. Governor of Fla.,
353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated for reh'g en banc, 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004), aff'd en
banc 405 F.3d 1214 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. 2005) (No. 05-212).
179. Id. at 1338-42.
180. Id. at 1342-43.
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The district court concluded that Florida's requirement that ex-felons
pay victim restitution before they are eligible for restoration of their civil
rights (including the right to vote) was not a poll tax because ex-felons had
already lost the right to vote as a result of being convicted. 181 The court
distinguished between the original grant of the right to vote and the rein-
statement of the right to vote, noting that the state was under no obligation
to re-enfranchise any ex-felons.182 The district court further concluded that
the condition was not an unconstitutional denial of the right to vote because
Florida provided an administrative mechanism by which the requirement to
pay victim restitution could potentially be waived. 183
The first Eleventh Circuit decision affirmed the resolution of this
claim. 184 Like the lower court, it concluded that because restoration of civil
rights could be granted to ex-felons who could not afford to pay full restitu-
tion via a waiver, the restoration process was not unconstitutional. 185 The
second Eleventh Circuit decision (en banc) summarily addressed the issue
in a footnote, stating without citation that under Florida's Rules of Execu-
tive Clemency, felons who could not afford to pay restitution could still
regain the right to vote. 186
Indeed, when both the lower court and first Eleventh Circuit court de-
cisions were released, the Florida Rules on Executive Clemency included a
procedure by which ex-felons could obtain a waiver of some of the prereq-
181. Id. at 1343. The court also implied that payment of the restitution was part of the plaintiffs'
sentences, stating that "[t]he Court finds that victim restitution is a crucial part of the debt the convicted
felon owes to both the victim and society." Id.
182. Id. The court stated:
[T]he State has permissibly stripped Plaintiffs of their right to vote along with other civil
rights pursuant to their felony convictions. The State is not constitutionally obligated to return
this right to them on completion of their sentence. The victim restitution requirement, then,
does not unduly burden the exercise of their right to vote given that that right has already been
stripped from them. The victim restitution requirement is not a special fee that they must pay
in order to exercise a right already existing in them, but a requirement made within the au-
thority of the State to begin the process of having their civil rights fully restored. It is not
Plaintiffs' right to vote which payment of a victim restitution is being conditioned but rather it
is the restoration of his civil rights which is being conditioned.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
183. Id. The court also noted that Florida's Clemency Rules had recently changed:
At the time this case was filed, the State's rules predicated clemency on payment of criminal
fines in excess of $1,000, and on payment of all victim restitution. In June, 2001, the Clem-
ency Rules were modified to eliminate the prerequisite that fines in excess of $1,000 be paid
prior to restoration of civil rights but retained the requirement that victim restitution be paid
before clemency can be granted and voting rights restored.
Id. at 1342.
184. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2003), vacated for reh 'g en banc,
377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004), affd en banc 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 74
U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. 2005) (No. 05-212).
185. Id.
186. Johnson, 405 F.3dat 1216 n.1.
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uisites of restitution. 187 The second Eleventh Circuit decision appears to
rely on the same provision. 188 However, the Rules were revised between
the two Eleventh Circuit decisions, and when the second decision was de-
cided, the Rules effectively prevented individuals who owe restitution from
being eligible for the waiver. 189 This change casts doubt on the Johnson
decisions that relied upon the possibility of a waiver in holding that the
restitution was not akin to a poll tax. Further, even the old version of the
rules included no guarantee that the waiver would ever be granted. In fact,
Rule 8(I)(B) indicates that if the Clemency Board does not act on waivers
within ninety days, the waivers are summarily denied. 190 Thus the generali-
zation that the requirement for restitution to be paid can be waived, and
therefore does not deny access to the right to vote, was not entirely accurate
at the time, and is no longer correct after the revisions to the Florida Rules.
While the successive Johnson decisions did not directly address whether
such payment is a poll tax, as each court pointed to the waiver provision,
the fact that the courts did not discredit or dismiss the analogy supports the
proposition that a poll tax claim could be successful. As the second Elev-
enth Circuit court decision noted in affirming the district court's decision
for the defendants on this claim, "we say nothing about whether condition-
187. See Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 8(1)(A) (eff. June 20, 2003), available at
https://fpc.state.fl.us/Policies/ExecClemency/ROEC6202003.pdf. New rules were released in Decem-
ber of 2004. See Fla. R. Exec. Clem. (eff. Dec. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.state.fl.us/fpc/Policies/ExecClemency/ROEC 12092004.pdf.
188. The court did not provide a citation for its statement, "Under Florida's Rules of Executive
Clemency, however, the right to vote can still be granted to felons who cannot afford to pay restitution."
Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1216 n.1.
189. The (new) Florida Rules of Executive Clemency provide that individuals applying for restora-
tion of civil rights must meet several criteria, including that:
A person may not apply for the restoration of his or her civil rights unless he or she has com-
pleted all sentences imposed and all conditions of supervision have expired or been com-
pleted, including, but not limited to, parole, probation, community control, control release,
and conditional release. In addition, the applicant may not have any outstanding victim resti-
tution, including, but not limited to, restitution pursuant to a court order or civil judgment, or
obligations pursuant to Chapter 960, Florida Statutes.
Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 5(1)(E) (eff. Dec. 9, 2004) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The rules were updated on December 9, 2004. The old version of Rule 8(I)(A) instructed, "If
an applicant cannot meet the requirements of Rule 5, he or she may seek a waiver of the rules so long as
at least two years have elapsed since the applicant was first convicted." Fla. R. Exec. Clem. (eff. June
20, 2003).
While the old rule did not reference outstanding restitution, id., the new rule does, stating, "If
an applicant cannot meet the requirements of Rule 5, he or she may seek a waiver of the rules so long as
at least two years have elapsed since the applicant was first convicted and, except for waivers for com-
mutation of sentence, no restitution is owed by applicant," Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 8(I)(A) (eff. Dec. 9,
2004) (emphasis added).
190. Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 8(I)(B) (eff. June 20, 2003). The 2004 version of that rule is identical. Fla.
R. Exec. Clem. 8(I)(B) (eff. Dec. 9, 2004).
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ing an application for clemency on paying restitution would be an invalid
poll tax." 191
C. Going Forward
The few cases that have included challenges to re-enfranchisement
provisions present a potential strategy for raising an equal protection claim.
Importantly, the plaintiff must have sufficient standing: the plaintiff must
otherwise meet all conditions of eligibility and should have attempted to
initiate re-enfranchisement proceedings. 192 To support an arbitrary en-
forcement claim, statistical data should be compiled and presented, as sug-
gested in Williams v. Taylor.193 While complete records comparing all
applications with applications granted and reasons behind granting applica-
tions are likely not easily acquired, the available evidence should be com-
piled. 194 Similarly, to support a poll tax claim, analyses of fees are
essential. If, as was the case with the old Florida Rules, 195 restitution must
be paid but a potential waiver exists, then the degree of frequency with
which the waiver is granted may indicate whether the restitution in actual-
ity functions as a fee or not.
IV. CURRENT RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
Most states do not have re-enfranchisement statutory schemes-the
majority of the states either disenfranchise only incarcerated felons or dis-
enfranchise incarcerated felons, probationers, and parolees. 196 Yet, fourteen
states disenfranchise at least some of their ex-felons for life or require a
waiting period. 197 Those states do provide at least some ex-felons with a
method for regaining the right to vote. But the procedures by which ex-
191. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1216 n.1.
192. The Farrakhan v. Washington court stated that "[t]he court further concluded that Plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge the process for restoration of civil rights under Section 9.94A.220, because
no Plaintiff had yet qualified for such relief or had even attempted to regain his civil rights." 338 F.3d
1009, 1014 n.9 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added), cert. denied sub nom Locke v. Farrakhan, 125 S. Ct.
477 (2004).
193. 677 F.2d 510, 517 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating, "[n]or is there any competent evidence to support
appellant's assertion that only the rich and influential in the state are able to obtain pardons").
194. Recently, the Sentencing Project released a report containing such statistics for the states that
permanently disenfranchise ex-felons or impose waiting periods. See MARC MAUER & TUSHAR
KANSAL, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BARRED FOR LIFE: VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION IN
PERMANENT DISENFRANCHISEMENT STATES (2005), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/barredforlife.pdf.
195. See supra note 189.
196. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 42. The fourteen states are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
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felons may have their right to vote restored vary widely from state to state
and may depend on the type of crime, when it was committed (and thus
which statutory scheme applies), and the application guidelines established
by statute.
A. Unclear Requirements and Distinctions Between In-State, Out-of-
State, and Federal Convictions
Laws governing re-enfranchisement vary widely in the fourteen life-
time or waiting-period disenfranchisement states. The processes by which
ex-felons can regain the right to vote are often unclear and are likely diffi-
cult to navigate. 198 In addition, distinctions between state and federal con-
victions do not withstand strict scrutiny.
Not all states officially codify or outline their requirements. In Dela-
ware, there is no official application form, and the guidance available is a
set of suggested steps that an individual can follow to apply for a pardon
from the Board of Pardons. 199 Similarly, while there is no statutory man-
date that an ex-felon must wait a certain amount of time after finishing his
or her sentence before applying for a pardon, the Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law reports that the Board typically requires a three to
five year waiting period and demonstrated good behavior.200 An individual
198. See MAUER & KANSAL, supra note 194, at 6. Mauer and Kansal provide data comparing the
number of felons disenfranchised to the number who attained restoration, shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1 Number of Felons Disenfranchised and Number Attaining Restoration
State Number Disenfranchised Restorations
Alabama 148,830 1,697 (est., 2004)
Arizona 58,936 N/A
Delaware 14,384 800 (est., 2000)
Florida 613,514 48,000 (1998-2004)
Iowa 80,257 2,210 (1999-2004)
Kentucky 109,132 1,320 (2002-2004)
Maryland 78,206 147 (1996-2003)
Mississippi 82,002 107 (1992-2004)
Nebraska 44,001 343 (1993-2004)
Nevada 43,395 50 (est., 2004)
Tennessee 28,720 393 (2001-2004)
Virginia 243,902 5,043 (1982-2004)
Washington 32,856 53 (1996-2004)
Wyoming 12,797 17(1995-2002)
Id.




may also wait five years after completing all terms of his or her sentence,
including paying any financial obligations. 201
Some states hinge procedures on the jurisdiction of the court of con-
viction. Individuals convicted of certain crimes in Mississippi lose the right
to vote. 202 It may only be regained through a pardon or executive order
issued by the governor, or through a two-thirds vote in the state legisla-
ture. 203 Individuals convicted of those crimes in federal courts or courts in
other states, however, do not lose their voting rights in Mississippi.204 In
addition, ex-felons in Washington who were convicted in a Washington
state court after July 1, 1984, automatically receive a certificate of dis-
charge after completing their sentence, which they may present to register
to vote. 205 Conversely, Washington ex-felons who were convicted in a
federal court or in another state must petition the Clemency and Pardons
Board to regain their right to vote.206
This type of different treatment does not withstand strict scrutiny, just
as the statutory scheme at issue in Shepherd v. Trevino would not have
withstood strict scrutiny.207 Neither of the traditional justifications for ex-
cluding ex-felons from the franchise applies here, where regaining the right
to vote can depend on the jurisdiction of the court of conviction. The purity
of the ballot box cannot be protected from any defined negative influence if
crimes inside or outside of the state are treated differently and in opposite
ways, and the same is true for crimes prosecuted by a federal court, as op-
posed to a state court. While there is a technical difference between the
initial grant of the right to vote and the reinstatement of the right to vote
(after the right had been taken away legitimately after a felony conviction),
the fundamental nature of the right to vote is identical. Because access to
the fundamental right to vote is the same, once a state institutes a mecha-
201. Id.
202. Id. § Miss.
203. MISS. CONST. art. XXII, § 253; MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-41 (1999); 50-STATE REPORT, supra
note 42, § Miss.
204. 50-STATE REPORT, supra note 42, § Miss.
205. Re-enfranchisement procedures vary in Washington, depending on the date of conviction. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.96.050 (West 2003); see also MAUER & KANSAL, supra note 194, at 22.
For those convicted before July 1, 1984, and who completed their sentences before 1993, the right to
vote is not automatically restored, and those ex-felons must apply to the Indeterminate Sentence Review
Board. Id. Beginning in 1993, those convicted before July 1, 1984, automatically receive a certificate of
discharge (which they need to register to vote), three years after completing their sentence. Id. Individu-
als convicted in a Washington state court after July 1, 1984, automatically receive a certificate of dis-
charge after completing their sentence. Id. However, certain sex offenders have no procedure by which
they may regain the right to vote. Id.
206. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.885 (West 2003); see also MAUER & KANSAL, supra
note 194, at 22.
207. See 575 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1978); supra text accompanying notes 150-55.
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nism to regain the right to vote, then that mechanism must provide equal
treatment. 208
Neither does this legal distinction find justification in the second tradi-
tional basis for felony disenfranchisement, preventing ex-felons from influ-
encing elections. 209 Hinging the sheer possibility of regaining the right to
vote on the jurisdiction in which a crime was committed bears no apparent
relation to the fear of unwanted influence of elections-it is difficult to
imagine that ex-felons' voting trends differ depending on the jurisdiction in
which they were convicted. In addition, Supreme Court jurisprudence does
not condone acting on such a fear. To the contrary, the Court has directed
that "fencing out" a section of the population from voting because of their
political views and the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. 210 Further, research demonstrates that ex-felons are not unanimously
intent on destroying criminal law, but rather generally support it and be-
lieve in the importance of the existing criminal laws.211
B. Almost Unrealistic Requirements
The ex-felon re-enfranchisement laws in these fourteen states do not
survive equal protection analysis for additional reasons. Many of these laws
require ex-felons to persuade the governor or similar authority to grant a
pardon or a restoration of the right to vote. 212 Realistically, this option ap-
208. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
209. The "purity of the ballot box" concept focuses on both morality and voting trends that are
colored by morality. Thus it encompasses both preserving the franchise for moral voters, see Wash. v.
State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884), and preventing assumedly non-moral ex-felons from influencing elec-
tions with their votes (which assumedly flow from non-moral viewpoints), see supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text.
210. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
211. Ewald, supra note 16, at 1100-01 (discussing a study by political scientist Jonathan D. Cas-
per).
212. The fourteen states require individuals to apply to a variety of executive bodies:
Individuals must apply to the Board of Pardons and Paroles in Alabama. MAUER & KANSAL,
supra note 194, at 7.
In Arizona, individuals must submit applications to the superior court in an individual's
county of residence. Id. at 8.
Persons convicted of certain crimes must apply to the Board of Pardons in Delaware or wait
until five years after the expiration of their sentences. 50-STATE REPORT, supra note 42, § Del. Expira-
tion includes the completion of imprisonment, probation, and parole, as well as satisfaction of all finan-
cial obligations. Id.
In Florida, individuals must apply to the Clemency Board, which includes the governor and
members of his or her cabinet. MAUER & KANSAL, supra note 194, at 10.
Per permanent law in Iowa, individuals may either apply to the governor for a pardon or to the
Board of Parole for a Restoration of Citizenship. Id. at 12.
Residents of Kentucky must submit an Application for Restoration to civil rights to the Divi-
sion of Probation and Parole. Id. at 14. Those applications are then forwarded to the governor for his or
her consideration. Id.
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pears unachievable. Ex-felons who do not have the time and money to in-
vest in such an undertaking would be at a severe disadvantage. The result-
ing situation-where individuals with more resources could access a
fundamental right, and less wealthy individuals could not access that
right-is akin to a poll tax or defacto wealth discrimination. Moreover, as
a joint publication of Human Rights Watch and The Sentencing Project
suggests,
In theory, ex-offenders can regain the right to vote. In practice, this pos-
sibility is usually illusory .... Released ex-felons are not routinely in-
formed about the steps necessary to regain the vote and often believe-
incorrectly-that they can never vote again. Moreover, even if they seek
to have the vote restored, few have the financial and political resources
needed to succeed.213
Statistics and examples also reflect this. For example, out of 12,797
disenfranchised ex-felons in Wyoming, seventeen had their voting rights
Persons permanently disenfranchised in Maryland must apply to the governor for a pardon. Id.
at 15.
In Mississippi, individuals can either apply for a pardon from the governor, apply for an
executive order from the governor to restore civil rights, or convince a two-thirds majority of the state
legislature to pass a bill of suffrage on their behalf. Id. at 16.
In Nebraska, individuals must wait two years after completing their sentences. See L.B. 53,
99th Leg., I st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005), available at http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/legal/SLIPLB53.pdf
(last visited Aug. 10, 2005).
In Nevada, individuals must either obtain a pardon from the Board of Pardons Commissioners
(which includes the governor, who must approve all pardons) or petition the court of conviction for
restoration of civil rights. MAUER & KANSAL, supra note 194, at 18.
Tennessee has a complex re-enfranchisement scheme, and depending on the date of conviction
and type of crime, an individual should either apply to his or her local circuit court, the court of convic-
tion, or the Board of Probation and Parole. Id. at 19. An individual may also petition the governor for a
pardon. Id.
In Virginia, individuals must either apply to the local circuit court, the court of conviction, or
the governor through the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Id. at 20.
In Washington, individuals must apply to the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board or the
Clemency and Pardons Board (if the conviction was in another state or a federal court). Decisions by
the Clemency and Pardons Board are not reviewed by the governor. Id. at 22.
Finally, in Wyoming, individuals convicted of a first-time non-violent felony can apply to the
Board of Parole, and other ex-felons must apply to the governor for a pardon or restoration of civil
rights. Id. at 24.
Note that not all ex-felons in each of these states needs to apply for restoration-some ex-
felons in these states are automatically re-enfranchised, such as individuals with a single felony convic-
tion in Arizona. See id. at 8.
213. FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 19, at 5. Findings for a proposed federal bill, H.R. 1300,
discussed infra Part V, included similar comments:
In those States that disenfranchise ex-offenders, the right to vote can be regained in theory,
but in practice this possibility is often illusory .... In some States, Federal offenders cannot
use the State procedure for restoring their civil rights. The only method provided by Federal
law for restoring voting rights to ex-offenders is a Presidential pardon. Few persons who seek
to have their right to vote restored have the financial and political resources needed to suc-
ceed.
Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 2005, H.R. 1300, 109th Cong. § 2 para. 5 (2005).
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restored between 1995 and 2002.214 In Mississippi, an ex-felon may either
apply for a pardon or executive order from the governor, or convince two-
thirds of the legislature to pass a private bill.215 In Alabama, certain ex-
felons applying for a gubernatorial pardon in order to regain their right to
vote may be required to provide a DNA sample 216-an additional indica-
tion that the re-enfranchisement laws are arbitrary. And in Virginia, the
length of time before an ex-felon can apply for a restoration of civil rights
(such as the right to run for office and the right to vote) increases from
three years to five years if the crime was violent or involved drug manufac-
turing or distribution; however, those individuals are entirely prohibited
from using the separate court procedure by which an ex-felon can regain
only the right to vote. 217
The politics of the governor of a state, or an individual's political
clout, may determine whether that individual's right to vote will be re-
stored. In Virginia, Democratic Governor Mark Warner has granted peti-
tions to restore voting rights for 1,892 ex-felons since he took office in
January 2002, rejecting only 114 petitions.218 Two prior governors, both
Republicans, restored the votes of 238 and 460 ex-felons, respectively. 219
In contrast, a Democratic governor before them granted restoration to 1,180
individuals. 220 The House Majority Leader (usually an opponent of War-
ner) indicated that he believed that Warner's actions were not politically
motivated, and in the same vein, the governor's spokesperson reported that
the governor wanted to speed up the process because of the upcoming elec-
tion (so more residents could vote).221 However, considering the Secretary
of the Commonwealth's comment that governors have "total discretion" in
granting, denying, or ignoring restoration requests,222 the process may be
214. MAUER & KANSAL, supra note 194, at 24.
215. MISS. CONST. art. XXII, § 253; MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-41 (1999); 50-STATE REPORT, supra
note 42, § Miss.
216. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25 (2001); PATRICIA ALLARD & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, REGAINING THE VOTE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITY RELATING TO FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 5 (2000), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9085.pdf.
The 50-STATE REPORT also notes this requirement:
Certain persons applying for a pardon, including felons convicted after May 6, 1994 and fel-
ons incarcerated as of that date, must submit a DNA sample as a mandatory condition of the
pardon. If you are unsure whether your DNA sample is on file with the Alabama Department
of Forensic Sciences, contact your probation or parole officer.
50-STATE REPORT, supra note 42, § Ala.
217. Id. § Va.
218. Christina Bellantoni, Warner Gives Rights Back to 1,892 Felons, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004,







somewhat politically driven in general, or at least driven by personal pref-
erences of the granting authority. Practically, this means that regaining the
right to vote can depend not only on one's state of residence, the type of
crime, the jurisdiction in which the crime was committed, and the proce-
dures established by statute, but regaining the right to vote may also depend
heavily on the unfettered discretion of the granting authority. These factors
combine to create restricted access to the right to vote for ex-felons in these
states, which results in disparate treatment of similarly situated individu-
als-the antithesis of equal protection.
V. FEDERAL LAWS VS. STATE LAWS
Felony disenfranchisement has garnered attention at a national level.
The social ramifications of lifetime disenfranchisement, such as further
excluding ex-felons from society and impairing their ability to reintegrate,
are cause for national concern; these ramifications run counter to rehabilita-
tion, one of the goals of the criminal justice system, 223 and do not function
properly as retribution.224 In addition, there is a severely disproportionate
impact on African American men overall. 225 And with the addition of harsh
sentencing policies such as "three strikes" laws, 2 26 the number of offenders
sent to prison for more than a year-and thus disenfranchised-has in-
creased. 227 For instance, individuals arrested for drug offenses were almost
five times as likely to be sent to prison in 1992 as in 1980.228
Such problems have prompted repeated proposals of federal bills that
would address voting rights of ex-felons in elections for federal offices.
U.S. Representative John Conyers, Jr.229 has introduced such a bill several
223. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 19, at 786-88; Fletcher, supra note 47, at 1907 (commenting
that instead "we should be encouraging inmates to begin thinking of themselves as useful members of
society with all the attendant responsibilities. Having the responsibility to vote should be the minimal
condition for inculcating the sense that felons too are citizens").
224. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 19, at 788-92; Fletcher, supra note 47, at 1896.
225. In 1998, the statistics clearly reflect a heavy impact on black men. FELLNER & MAUER, supra
note 19, at 8. Thirteen percent of all adult black men were disenfranchised in 1998-1.4 million indi-
viduals, at a rate seven times the national average. Id. In Alabama and Florida, for instance, thirty-one
percent of all black men are permanently disenfranchised. Id. In Delaware, one in five black men is
currently disenfranchised. Id.
226. For instance, in United States v. Washington, the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of the federal "three strikes" law that made a sentence of life imprisonment mandatory for a defendant
who was convicted of a "serious, violent felony" after having been convicted of two or more serious,
violent felonies in the past. 109 F.3d 335, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 847 (1997).
See also FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 19, at 11.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. (D-MI). See United States House of Representatives, Congressman John Conyers, Jr. Biogra-
phy Page, http://www.house.gov/conyers/news-biography.htm (last visited July 17, 2005).
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times, with the most recent bill, H.R. 1300, entitled "Civic Participation
and Rehabilitation Act of 2005."230 Both this bill and its predecessors, H.R.
259 in 2003231 and H.R. 906 in 1999,232 include the following core section:
The right of an individual who is a citizen of the United States to vote in
any election for Federal office shall not be denied or abridged because
that individual has been convicted of a criminal offense unless such indi-
vidual is serving a felony sentence in a correctional institution or facility
at the time of the election. 233
The power of Congress to enact this bill was the subject of a subcom-
mittee hearing when the bill was proposed in 1999, where attendees dis-
cussed various sources of authority, including the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Elections Clause. 234 An attorney from the Brennan Center for Jus-
tice at NYU School of Law, Gillian Metzger, argued that the Election
Clause provided authority under reasoning similar to that used in Oregon v.
Mitchell.235 In Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld certain amendments to
the Voting Rights Act, including one that enfranchised individuals aged
eighteen years and over for federal elections.236 Justice Black, announcing
the judgment of the Court on this issue, reasoned that the Election Clause
allowed Congress to set the age qualification for national elections, stating,
"[I]t is the prerogative of Congress to oversee the conduct of presidential
and vice-presidential elections and to set the qualifications for voters for
electors for those offices. It cannot be seriously contended that Congress
has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over
congressional elections. '' 237 However, Richard Clegg, vice president and
general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity,238 presented a
counterargument at the subcommittee hearing, arguing that the Elections
Clause simply does not provide authority because it applies only to time,
place, and manner regulations. 239
230. Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 2005, H.R. 1300, 109th Cong. (2005).
231. Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 2003, H.R. 259, 108th Cong. (2003).
232. Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999).
233. H.R. 1300 § 3; H.R. 259 § 3; H.R. 906 § 3.
234. See Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju62486.000/hju624860f.htm (last visited July 31,
2005) [hereinafter 1999 Hearing].
235. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (plurality opinion); 1999 Hearing at 22-24
(statement of Gillian Metzger, Staff Attorney, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law).
236. 400 U.S. at 117-18 (opinion of Black, J.).
237. Id. at 124 (footnote omitted).
238. Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159 n.* (2001). The Center for Equal
Opportunity is a research and educational organization based in Washington, D.C. Id.
239. 1999 Hearing, supra note 234, at 17-18 (statement of Clegg).
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In addition, Metzger also proposed that because some disenfranchise-
ment laws had a discriminatory basis, Congress could decide to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause's ban on racial discrimination by granting ex-
felons the right to vote in federal elections across the board.240 Clegg coun-
tered that there must be a discriminatory intent, not just a disparate impact,
for Congress to exercise its power under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments. 241 Yet, the Court has suggested otherwise. In both Griffin v.
Illinois and later in Williams v. Illinois, cases clearly not involving dis-
criminatory intent, the Court admonished, "[A] law nondiscriminatory on
its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. '242
The Court's directive in Richardson v. Ramirez that the case be re-
manded to evaluate the possibility of a lack of uniformity in the enforce-
ment of the disenfranchisement law, 243 plus the outcome of Hunter v.
Underwood, where the Court struck down a provision in the Alabama Con-
stitution because it had a discriminatory intent,244 also suggest that felony
disenfranchisement laws, and thus ex-felon re-enfranchisement provisions,
are governed by section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, and hence are
subject to section five's enforcement power.245 Additionally, in Oregon v.
Mitchell, Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall contended that while there
may have been an Equal Protection claim in the age restriction on voting
for the courts to address, 246 the three Justices decided the issue instead on
the enforcement power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment,
when Congress found discrimination against individuals between eighteen
and twenty-one years old.24 7 Similarly here, there is discrimination against
240. Id. at 26 (statement of Metzger).
241. Id. at 18 (statement of Clegg).
242. In a footnote in Griffin v. Illinois, which addressed access to trial transcripts for indigent
parties, Justice Black noted, "Dissenting opinions here argue that the Illinois law should be upheld since
by its terms it applies to rich and poor alike. But a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation." 351 U.S. 12, 17 n. 1 (1956) (plurality opinion) (opinion of Black, J.).
The majority opinion in Williams v. Illinois recounted the latter part while analyzing a case where
appellant had been subject to a longer prison sentence because he was indigent and could not pay court
costs and a fine that had been levied as punishment. 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970).
243. 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).
244. 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
245. See 1999 Hearing, supra note 234, at 25 (statement of Metzger).
246. 400 U.S. 112, 246 (1970) (Brennan, White, & Marshall, JJ., concurring in result) (stating that
"we are faced with an admitted restriction upon the franchise, supported only by bare assertions and
long practice, in the face of strong indications that the States themselves do not credit the factual propo-
sitions upon which the assertion is asserted to rest"). Justice Douglas went further and opined that
"Congress might well conclude that a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 was needed in the
interest of equal protection." Id. at 141 (opinion of Douglas, J.) (agreeing with the Court to uphold the
reduction in the voting age). Justice Harlan disagreed with basing Congress' power on the Equal Protec-
tion argument in this context, due to the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and the intent behind its
enactment. Id. at 154. (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. The Justices continued:
[Vol 81:199
RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS PROVIDE UNEQUAL TREATMENT
ex-felons in certain states, where they may be denied the right to vote, de-
pending on the various circumstances discussed above, while other ex-
felons can regain the right to vote.
Representative Conyers' bill is not the only proposed federal legisla-
tion that would re-enfranchise ex-felons. In February 2005, U.S. Senators
Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barbara Boxer announced election reform
legislation that, among other things, would restore voting rights to all ex-
felons.248 As introduced in the Senate, the pertinent part of this proposed
bill reads:
(d) Rights of Citizens.-The right of an individual who is a citizen of the
United States to vote in any election for Federal office shall not be de-
nied or abridged because that individual has been convicted of a criminal
offense unless, at the time of the election, such individual-
(1) is serving a felony sentence in a correctional institution or facility; or
(2) is on parole or probation for a felony offense. 249
In addition to this bill, numerous other bills have been introduced to
address voting rights of ex-felons, including the Ex-Offenders Voting
Rights Act of 2005250 and an act to amend the Help America Vote Act of




Felony disenfranchisement laws have been present throughout our na-
tion's history, and the controlling law, Richardson v. Ramirez, says that on
their face, they are not unconstitutional. However, they are not given blan-
But there is no reason for us to decide whether, in a proper case, we would be compelled to
hold this restriction a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For as our decisions have long
made clear, the question we face today is not one of judicial power under the Equal Protection
Clause. The question is the scope of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 246 (Brennan, White, & Marshall, JJ., concurring in age restriction result).
248. Statement, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Senators Clinton and Boxer, Representative
Tubbs Jones and Others to Unveil Major Election Reform Bill (Feb. 17, 2005),
http://clinton.senate.gov/news/statements (last visited July 31, 2005); Mary Curtius & Richard Simon,
Bills Would Alter Election Procedures, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at A23.
249. Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. § 701 (2005).
250. H.R. 663, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005). Section four contains language identical to the language
quoted from S. 450.
251. H.R. 4479, 108th Cong. § I (a)(6)(A) (2004). The pertinent proposed language reads:
(A) IN GENERAL.-No State may prohibit any individual who is a veteran from registering
to vote for any election for public office, or from voting in any election for public office, on
the grounds that the individual has been convicted of a felony if (at the time the individual
seeks to register to vote or vote) the individual is no longer in the custody of, or subject to su-
pervision by, the State or the Federal government as a result of the individual's conviction.
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ket approval. They can be struck down, at least for discriminatory intent,
and the Supreme Court has noted that "the Equal Protection Clause is not
shackled to the political theory of a particular era."'252 While it may have
been unthinkable decades ago to even provide ways for ex-felons to regain
the right to vote, now that these laws exist, the manner in which the laws
operate must meet equal protection standards. The "crazy-quilt" 253 of ex-
felon re-enfranchisement law is riddled with unequal treatment, both inside
individual states and among the several states. 254 These laws violate the
basic tenets of the Fourteenth Amendment, should be analyzed with strict
scrutiny, and must be simplified and clarified or ultimately struck down.
252. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S, 663, 669 (1966).
253. A report issued by the Department of Justice even used this term, noting, "Our research re-
vealed that the laws governing the same rights and privileges vary widely from state to state, making
something of a national crazy-quilt of disqualifications and restoration procedures." Susan M. Kuzma,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Disabilities of Convicted Felons: A State-by-State Survey, at i (1996),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/forms/state-survey.pdf (last visited July 31, 2005).
254. Unequal treatment exists among the several states in the context of national elections.
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